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RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB*
I. SCOPE
I return to the field in defense of interest analysis.I It is ironic that I should be
regarded as a champion of that cause. Brainerd Currie's most charitable character-
ization of my work would doubtless be heresy. I have spent a good deal of time
attempting to articulate forum-neutral solutions to two problems-the true conflict
and the unprovided-for case-that he would resolve by application of forum law.2
Furthermore, identification of the policies underlying domestic laws is not the Alpha
and Omega of conflicts analysis. Giving effect to transjurisdictional policies, includ-
ing the purposes of choice of law, is equally important. Currie and I agree only on
the following points: the policies represented by domestic rules can be useful guides
in resolving choice-of-law problems; and the conflict of laws should join the
mainstream of legal reasoning. It is these propositions that this article will defend; the
exposition of Currie's viewpoints will be left to his own superbly crafted articles. 3
This article will first respond to the most common criticisms of basing conflicts
decisions on policies underlying domestic rules. It will then suggest how this form of
analysis can be applied to products liability cases. 4
* Professor of Law and holder of John B. Connally Chair in Civil Jurisprudence, University of Texas at Austin
School of Law. Author of CommsImErArY ON "Mr CONFucr OF LAws (2d ed. 1980). B.A., New York University 1950; J.D.,
Harvard Law School 1953.
1. On two previous occasions I have discussed a narrower range of criticisms of interest analysis. See Weintraub,
Interest Analysis in the Conflict of Laws as an Application of Sound Legal Reasoning, 35 MERcER L. REv. 629 (1984);
Weintraub, John P. Frank's Criticisms of Recent Developments in the Conflict of Laws, 47 TEx. L. REv. 977 (1969).
2. See Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. Cni. L. RE,. 227, 261
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Currie, Married Women's Contracts] (true conflict); Currie, Survival ofActions: Adjudication
versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STr. L. REv. 205, 229 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Currie, Survival of
Actions] (unprovided-for case); but cf. R. WFNTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFtCt OF LAws § 6.3 (true conflict), § 6.23
(unprovided-for case) (2d ed. 1980).
3. Most of them are collected in B. CuRRE, SE.EcrEo ESSAYS ON THE CONFucr OF LAWS (1963).
Professor Currie never claimed to have invented interest analysis. For one of the best known of the earlier
formulations of interest analysis in this century, see Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L.
REv. 1210, 1216-17, 1223-24 (1946). Professor Currie acknowledges Professor Freund's influence in Currie, Married
Women's Contracts, supra note 2, at 235 n. 18. The concept that the territorial reach of a statute should be determined
by the purposes underlying it has been traced back at least as far as the writings of Guy de Coquille in the sixteenth century.
See Juenger, A Page of History, 35 MERcER L. REv. 419, 432-33 (1984).
4. One thing should be clear from the outset: There are warts on interest analysis, just as there are flaws in any
method of resolving legal disputes. The question is always whether, in the light of costs and benefits, one approach is
preferable to another. As much data as possible should be examined in making that judgment, but the answer is likely to
be highly subjective, based on tenets of legal and social philosophy that transcend any particular point being debated.
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I. CRITICISMS OF INTEREST ANALYSIS
A. Difficulty of Determining What Policies Underlie a Rule
Many critics of interest analysis contend that it is difficult or impossible to
determine the policies underlying a particular domestic rule.5 The rule may result
from the compromise of competing purposes or may embody no discernible policy at
all. 6 Moreover, states do not have interests in litigation between private parties. 7
The objection that it is difficult to determine the purposes of a rule is the most
surprising criticism. There is nothing new or remarkable about the proposition that
legal rules have purposes which can be identified. Even in purely local cases, an
intelligent decision to apply a rule in a marginal situation (one that does not clearly
fall within or without the scope of a rule) depends upon knowing the reasons for the
rule. These reasons are not always easy to identify, and sometimes there will be
disagreement over them. However, before a rule is applied, the purposes of the rule
should be discerned.
When choice-of-law analysis focuses on the reasons underlying putatively
conflicting domestic rules, it simply mirrors the form of intelligent analysis employed
in all fields of law. Cardozo observed that, under the territorial rules of his day, the
conflict of laws was "one of the most baffling subjects of legal science" in which
"fundamental conceptions have been developed to their uttermost conclusions by the
organon of logic." 8 He indicated his discomfort with the state of conflicts thinking:
"[W]hen I view the [conflict of laws] as a whole, I find logic to have been more
remorseless here, more blind to final causes, than it has been in other fields. Very
likely it has been too remorseless." 9 Cardozo's use of the phrase "too remorseless"
indicates that he believed conflicts analysis had departed from the flexible policy-
oriented approach that wise judges used in other areas. Cardozo illustrates the
desirable method of adjudication by using the law of negligence. His remarks are fully
applicable to choice of law:
Back of the answers is a measurement of interests, a balancing of values, an appeal to the
experience and sentiments and moral and economic judgments of the community, the
group, the trade. Of course, some of these valuations become standardized with the lapse
of years, and thus instantaneous, or, as it were, intuitive .... On the other hand, a
judgment even so obvious as this yields quickly to the pressure of new facts with new
social implications .... We are balancing and compromising and adjusting every mo-
ment that we judge. 10
The argument is sometimes made that even if determining the purposes under-
lying domestic rules is feasible in interstate conflicts, it is not practicable in
5. See, e.g., Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique ofInterest Analysis, 32 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 33 (1984).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 36.
8. B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES oF LEGAL ScmcE 67 (1928), cited in Juenger, supra note 5, at I n.1.
9. B. CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 68.
10. Id. at 75.
[Vol. 46:493
DEFENSE OF INTEREST ANALYSIS
international conflicts because the judge of one country is not likely to understand the
purposes of the laws of a nation with an entirely different legal system." The
difficulty of finding the policies represented by foreign rules is overstated. Familiarity
with other legal systems grows apace. Furthermore, judges have the assistance of
counsel who have the time and incentive to make the necessary inquiries and to obtain
expert assistance. 12 The greatest flaw in the argument distinguishing international
cases from interstate conflicts is that the argument is not for territorial choice of law,
but for forum law. The court should not apply foreign law if it does not understand
the purposes of that law. Wooden application of misunderstood foreign law is far
more likely to result in injustice than the application of forum law.
As for objection to the term "state interests," it refers to the purposes underlying
a law of that state. It is probably a needlessly confusing term. I prefer "functional
analysis" to "interest analysis."
B. The Territorial Reach of Policies Is Not Self-Evident
Another criticism of interest analysis is that even if the purposes of a rule can be
discovered, the rule's geographical reach is not apparent. There still must be a
territorial connecting factor. 13 The fault with this criticism is that the purposes
underlying a rule reveal the social consequences that the rule is designed either to
foster or to avoid. Lawyers and judges can determine whether, in the light of a state's
contacts with the parties or with the transaction, those consequences will be experi-
enced there if its law is not applied.
If one woke up in the morning with a blank mind, set out to discover the world,
and turned to the conflict of laws, he or she would probably create a territorial system;
any other method is counter-intuitive. It is easy to conclude that each jurisdiction's
law ought to apply only to events within it. When pressed for an explanation of the
system, one would say, "If a state or nation cannot determine the rules that apply to
events that take place within its borders, social consequences would occur there that
the state or nation had designed its law to prevent." Once that is said, however, the
whole system would crumble. A little reflection would reveal that application of situs
law would sometimes cause social consequences elsewhere, while failure to apply lex
loci would have no local effects. There are few "nevers" in any rational system of
jurisprudence, but there is one candidate: if personal injury is caused by unintentional
conduct and the place of injury has no other contacts with the parties, applying the
law of the place of injury never will advance the purpose of its rule that denies or
limits recovery.
11. See Scoles, Interstate and International Distinctions in Conflict of Laws in the United States, 54 CALIF. L. REv.
1599, 1613 (1966).
12. See id. at 1622-23.
13. See Brilmayer, InterestAnalysis and the Myth of LegislativeIntent, 78 MIcH. L. REv. 392,393 (1980); Juenger,
supra note 5, at 35-36.
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C. Uncertainty of Result
Another argument against interest analysis is that a functional analysis, resting
on the shifting sands of policy, can lead to chaos. 14 Territorially oriented choice-of-
law rules, on the other hand, have the virtue of certainty. A famous series of New
York decisions dealing with the application of the "guest" statutes of other juris-
dictions, which limit a guest passenger's right to recover against a host driver,
illustrates the confusion that can occur when functional analysis is misunderstood.
15
In desperation, the New York Court of Appeals adopted three rules that would
thereafter apply to guest statute cases.16 Rule three, the catchall provision, is a thinly
disguised version of the old place-of-wrong rule. If this can occur in New York,
which led the judicial revolt against territorial choice-of-law rules, it can, and
probably will, happen anywhere.
The New York experience is not a necessary concomitant of adopting a
functional conflicts analysis. It is the inevitable result of both misunderstanding and
misapplying policy analysis. In the strangest of the New York line of cases, Dym v.
Gordon,17 the court applied a Colorado guest statute to deny recovery to a New York
guest suing a New York host although New York law would have made the host liable
for negligence. In order to work this magic, the New York Court of Appeals had to
violate the central teaching of functional analysis. It invented a purpose underlying the
Colorado statute that had never before been stated-the preservation of the host's
liability insurance proceeds for compensation of occupants of automobiles with which
the host collides.18
There are certain desirable attributes of any legal system. The characteristics
most pertinent to the present discussion are predictability of results, just results, and
accessibility. These three characteristics are related, and there is likely to be tension
between them. Predictability is necessary to plan transactions and, when disputes
arise, to facilitate settlement. Predictability also reduces the cost and complexity of
litigation. Justice is important because it is unlikely that any legal rule, no matter how
easy to apply, will long survive if it produces results that are perceived to be unjust.
The results will be unjust if they are poor responses to the social problem to which
the rule is addressed. Accessibility is necessary if the legal system is not to serve only
the wealthy and the privileged. Tension is likely to arise between the need for just
results on one hand and predictability and accessibility on the other. The more we try
to mold each decision to fit the particular circumstances of a case, the less predictable
and more costly the administration of justice is likely to become.
The solution to this problem lies in functional rules that are satisfactory responses
to underlying social problems and that also yield reasonable predictability when
14. See Juenger, supra note 5, at 8.
15. See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972); Tooker v. Lopez, 24
N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969); Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274
N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966); Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120,209 N.E.2d 792,262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965); Babcock v. Jackson,
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
16. See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
17. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
18. Id. at 124, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
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administered by the members of a learned profession. It may well be that there is no
other solution. In a system based on case law and precedent, the only reliable rule may
be one that summarizes a series of just and reasonable decisions.
The rigid and simple territorial choice-of-law rules seemed child's play to ap-
ply. If, for example, the tort rule was place-of-wrong, the court could stick a pin in
the map where the plaintiff was injured, find the tort law of that place, and apply it.
But intelligent lawyers and judges who were unhappy with the result thus obtained
found ways around the mechanical rule. Characterization tricks could be played.
What was alleged to be a "tort" problem could have its label switched to "proce-
dural"' t9 so that the law of the forum rather than of the place of injury applied. This
was formerly fairly common in the United States with an issue as important as the
measure of damages for tortious injury20 and is still found in English decisions.2 '
Lawyers and judges also circumvented the rule by putting a different substantive
label on the problem so that a new territorial rule would emerge and point to a
place other than where injury occurred. "Tort" could change in this way, for ex-
ample, to "contract," 2 2 or "family law," 23 or "administration of estates." 24 As a
last resort, the "public policy" doctrine could preclude application of the law se-
lected by the forum's choice-of-law rule. 25
The reason for recharacterization is that important policies underlying a law not
selected by the territorial rule will be impaired and policies of the law selected are
either not relevant or should yield. If, as is typical of the label-switching opinions, this
reason is not stated, the recharacterization appears arbitrary and the results are
unpredictable-far less predictable than they would be under a rule that originally
directed attention to maximum accommodation of policies underlying the domestic
laws of contact states. A functional approach moves public policy to the foreground
to shape the original selection of governing law instead of serving as a last-minute
escape from that choice.
There is no reason why functional choice-of-law rules that take account of the
purposes of conflicting domestic laws and that also produce reasonably predictable
results cannot be stated. Once the different policies of two or more jurisdictions are
implicated, the conflict between them should be resolved by result-oriented presump-
tions. Examples are, for torts, a presumption that the law favorable to the plaintiff
should be applied and, for contracts, a presumption that the law that validates the
contract should be applied. These presumptions are not pulled out of the air. They
reflect widely shared trends in the development of the substantive area involved and
in transjurisdictional policies. Moreover, the presumptions as to results are rebuttable.
19. See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (limit on
damages for wrongful death).
20. See, e.g., id.
21. See. e.g., Chaplin v. Boys, 11969] 3 W.L.R. 322, 2 All E.R. 1085.
22. See, e.g., Hudson v. Continental Bus Sys., 317 S.W.2d 584 (rex. Civ. App. 1958) (writ refused, no reversible
error).
23. See, e.g., Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
24. See, e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
25. See, e.g., Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
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The factors that might rebut them are drawn from the same transjurisdictional trends
and policies that formed the basis for the original presumption. Examples are denial
of tort recovery for injury to an employee 26 and refusal to validate contracts of
adhesion. 27 The rule I propose to govern choice of law for contract validity is: A
contract is valid if valid under the law of the settled place of business or residence
of the party wishing to enforce the contract unless the settled place of business or
residence of the other party has an invalidating rule designed to protect against
contracts of adhesion. This rule is one that can be administered by judges and lawyers
in a way that will yield an acceptable degree of predictability of results and will
respond satisfactorily to almost all transjurisdictional contract cases. There are, to be
sure, other factors that will affect the proper response to a conflict concerning the
validity of a contract. There may be strong rules invalidating contracts that are illegal
or immoral even though they are not contracts of adhesion. But the rule I suggest will
work well in almost all cases and, when it does not, other relevant factors28 can be
stated as exceptions to this broad validating rule.
D. Forum Preference for Its Own Law
It has been charged that functional analysis, particularly the aspect of it that
focuses on the policies underlying domestic rules, is a circumlocution for applying the
law of the forum. 29 As a practical matter, a court using this method will find a
sufficient forum interest to make forum law relevant and then will resolve any clash
between forum and foreign policies by finding that forum law is "better. "30
There is evidence to support this charge. Probably the most notorious example
is Lilienthal v. Kaufman.31 This 1964 Oregon Supreme Court opinion refused to
enforce the commercial indebtedness of an Oregon resident when suit was brought by
a California creditor. Under a unique Oregon procedure, the debtor had been declared
a spendthrift. A guardian was appointed, and the guardian exercised his power to
avoid the obligation. The Oregon debtor had traveled to California to borrow the
money to finance a business venture, and the California creditor was unaware of the
debtor's "spendthrift" status. The court resolved the clash between Oregon and
California policies by explicitly adopting a forum-preference rule saying "[w]e are of
the opinion that in such a case the public policy of Oregon should prevail and the law
of Oregon should be applied .... ",32 The result has been widely condemned 33 and
26. See Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978)
(Louisiana law applied to deny recovery to California employer for injury to employee in Louisiana).
27. See Zogg v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 276 F.2d 861, 864 (2d Cir. 1960) ("If any trend is discernible in these
cases, it is that of a forum to apply its own law to adhesion contracts of insurance entered into by its residents.").
28. See the factors set out in R. WXnErrRAUB, supra note 2, at § 7.5 (Does the rule reflect a current trend? Do the
laws differ in basic policy or minor detail? Should the parties have foreseen the interest of the state with the invalidating
rule? Is the context noncommercial? Have the courts of one state deferred in similar cases to the policies underlying the
law of the other state?).
29. See Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 389-99; Juenger, supra note 5, at 10, 13.
30. Id.
31. 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
32. Id. at 16, 395 P.2d at 549.
33. See, e.g., D. CAvERs, THE CHOiCE-oF-LAw PRocEss 192 (1965).
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is probably wrong because the invalidating Oregon rule was aberrational, the
California creditor was unfairly surprised, and the preferred transjurisdictional solu-
tion would have been to validate this commercial agreement.
But Lilienthal is not an example of a decision in which forum law was declared
"better." The court was applying Currie's mandate that in the event of a true clash
between forum and foreign objectives, forum law should prevail. The court quickly
abandoned this notion in a tort case decided three years later.34 The court probably
leaned too far in the opposite direction by denying an Oregon wife damages for
injuries to her husband in the course of his employment in Washington. Oregon law
gave her the right to recover, but Washington law did not. There would have been no
unfair surprise to the Washington employer in holding it liable under the law of the
state where the employee resided and where the employer was licensed to do business.
The court stated that "state chauvinism and interstate retaliation are dangers to be
avoided."35
Conklin v. Homer36 is a classic example of interest fabrication coupled with
preference for "better" forum law. That case involved an Illinois host and guest and
a crash in Wisconsin. Illinois had a guest statute which would have barred the action
by the passenger, but Wisconsin law permitted recovery. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court found three Wisconsin policies that would be advanced by permitting recovery:
compensation of the injured guest, avoidance of loss to Wisconsin taxpayers or
medical creditors, and deterrence of negligent driving in Wisconsin. 37 The compen-
sation policy is simply another way of saying that Wisconsin law should be manna for
the injured of the world even though the social consequences of failure to compensate
are likely to be experienced in Illinois, which had contrary policies. This is the
antithesis of interest analysis. Preventing the cost of medical treatment from falling
on Wisconsin taxpayers or doctors is a legitimate concern, but first there should be
some showing that, on the facts of Conklin, these evils were likely to occur. The
contention that the increased chances of civil recovery will make Illinois hosts drive
more carefully in Wisconsin is untenable.
Even though Conklin was criticized as a distortion of interest analysis, 38 the court
did not alter its opinion. In Hunker v. Royal Indemnity Company,39 criticisms of
Conklin were dismissed as "naive."' 4 Hunker itself, however, showed that the
Wisconsin court would not invariably prefer its own law. In Hunker, two Ohio
residents were driving in Wisconsin in the course of their employment. After a crash
in Wisconsin, the passenger brought a direct action against his fellow employee's
liability insurer. Under Ohio law, worker's compensation was the sole remedy, but
under Wisconsin law, tort recovery was available. Despite its finding that Ohio and
34. Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967).
35. Id. at 284, 428 P.2d at 907 (quoting Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 354, 222 A.2d 205, 208 (1966)).
36. 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
37. Id. at 476-77, 157 N.W.2d at 583.
38. See R. W wrmtmm, ComEmrraY oN THE CoNcr oF LAws 245-47 (1971).
39. 57 Wis. 2d 588, 204 N.W.2d 897 (1973).
40. Id. at 604 n.2, 204 N.W.2d at 905 n.2.
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Wisconsin were "both interested jurisdictions,' ' 41 the court applied Ohio law and
barred suit. Conklin was distinguished as follows:
The bar of co-employees' actions does not represent merely past thinking. The trend, to
the extent that it is discernible, appears to be toward barring these actions rather than
permitting them. We cannot conclude, as we did in... Conklin, that Wisconsin's rule
of liability unmistakably represents the better law.42
Thus, forum preference is not the rule, even in the home of Conklin v. Homer.
Another case in which the court used interest analysis and resolved a clash of
state policies in favor of the law of a sister state is Offshore Rental Company v.
Continental Oil Company.43 A California employer sued a Louisiana company for
injury in Louisiana to a key employee. A California statute arguably provided a cause
of action for resulting losses to the employer, but no recovery was available under
Louisiana law. The California Supreme Court resolved the "true conflict"44 between
California and Louisiana policies in favor of the "stronger, more current interest of
Louisiana. "45
A similar result was reached by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Bigelow v.
Halloran.4 6 The plaintiff lived in Iowa at the time she was shot by her Minnesota
boyfriend, who then turned the gun on himself and committed suicide. After she
moved to Minnesota, the plaintiff brought suit against her assailant's estate. Under
Minnesota law, the action for an intentional tort was terminated by defendant's death,
but the claim survived under Iowa law. The court found that "the governmental
interests test prove[d] to be inconclusive" 47 because both Iowa and Minnesota policies
were implicated. However, the court resolved the conflict in favor of Iowa law as the
"better rule ' 48 because it was more in accord with trends in the law of survival of
actions.
Cipolla v. Shaposka49 also belies the inevitability of forum preference. Two
young men, one from Delaware and one from Pennsylvania, attended school in
Delaware. At the end of the school day, the Delaware resident was driving his friend
home to Pennsylvania. The car crashed in Delaware. Under Delaware law, the host
driver was not liable for his ordinary negligence, but he was liable under Pennsylvania
law. A majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court resolved the "true conflict" 50 in
favor of Delaware law on the ground that the Delaware defendant "should not be put
in jeopardy of liability exceeding that created by [his] state's laws just because a
visitor from a state offering higher protection decides to visit there. '"51 The opposite
41. Id. at 594, 204 N.W.2d at 900.
42. Id. at 610, 204 N.W.2d at 908.
43. 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
44. Id. at 164, 583 P.2d at 725, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
45. Id. at 169, 583 P.2d at 729, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
46. 313 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1981).
47. Id. at 12.
48. Id. at 13.
49. 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
50. Id. at 568, 267 A.2d at 857.
51. Id. at 567, 267 A.2d at 856-57. The court cited D. CAVERS, supra note 33, at 146-47.
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result should have been reached. The host intended to drive into Pennsylvania. Thus,
Pennsylvania had a reasonable nexus with defendant's course of conduct, and,
although it was less clear at the time of the case in 1970 than it is today, 52 the
Delaware guest statute should have yielded to the Pennsylvania rule which better
tracked current liability developments. But whether or not one agrees with the result,
Cipolla is further evidence that interest analysis is not another way of saying "forum
law applies and our resident wins."
The clearest example of a court inventing a nonexistent interest is Dym v.
Gordon,53 the guest-statute case in which the New York Court of Appeals, rather than
manipulating the analysis to apply forum law, managed to apply Colorado law to
deprive one New Yorker of recovery against another.
When one turns to transjurisdictional commercial contracts, the cases are legion
in which a forum has upheld an agreement under foreign law against a local
defendant. This is so common a result in usury cases54 that, according to the Second
Restatement, validation is the rule. 55 The Restatement would have better reflected the
results reached in adjudication if it had taken validation as its basic rule for all contract
issues.
E. Interest Analysis Focuses on Domicile at a Time of Great Population Mobility
It has also been charged that policy analysis is really a complex way of saying
that each jurisdiction is interested in making the benefits of its law available to its own
citizens but not to others. 56 This not only raises grave questions of unfair discrimi-
nation, but also focuses on domicile at a time of unprecedented population mobility.57
It is true that insofar as social consequences of applying law are likely to be
experienced where the parties live, interest analysis does focus on residence. But there
are other contacts that are relevant to policies underlying local law. For example, the
place where the defendant acts may have a rule designed to deter his conduct. If so,
the purpose of that rule will be advanced by applying it even though none of the
parties resides there. It is necessary, however, to be realistic about whether a rule
permitting recovery of civil damages will shape conduct. It is unlikely that such a rule
will deter negligent driving. If the driver is not made careful by the risk to his life and
the lives of his loved ones, or by the threat of criminal punishment, it is unrealistic
to think that when he crosses the state line he will say to himself, "I'd better slow
down; this state permits guests to recover against their hosts."
52. See infra note 66, which traces the disappearance of guest statutes since 1970.
53. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
54. See, e.g., Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927).
55. REsrATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLcT oF LAws, § 203 (1971).
56. See Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting its Own, 23 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 173, 179-81
(1982); Juenger, supra note 5, at 9.
57. See Corr, Interest Analysis and Choice of Law: The Dubious Dominance of Domicile, 1983 UTAi L. REv. 651
(1983); Juenger, supra note 5, at 39-40; Korn, The Choice of Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLuM. L. REv. 772, 777
(1983).
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Mobility is not as great a problem when dealing with companies as opposed to
individuals, and even with individuals there are ways to avoid unfair discrimination
against foreigners and to take account of mobility.
First, the benefits of local law should be made available to a nonresident when
this will not offend any policy of his state and will accord with the forum's view of
appropriate social responsibility. For example, a host driver should be liable to his
guest if liable under the law of the host's residence, even if there is no liability under
the law of the guest's residence or the place of injury. 58 This will make residents of
the host's state responsible loss distributors, and courts in that state should not be so
callous as to wish to implement this policy only when their own residents are injured.
Certainly the guest's residence will not object to his recovery. And if the guest later
moves to the host's state, application of its law has cast bread upon the waters.
Second, mobility should be taken account of directly. In each case, the question
of how likely it is that social consequences will be experienced in a state other than
the one in which the parties resided at the time of the occurrence should be addressed.
Moves that have occurred between the event and decision of the case should be
considered, subject to the caveat that doing so should not encourage house shopping,
deter a move otherwise in a party's best interest, or be unfair to the other party.
59
F. Depecage
"Depecage" refers to the application of the laws of different states to separate
issues in the same case.60 The problem existed under territorial choice-of-law rules.
Many outcome determinative rules were dysfunctionally characterized as "proce-
dural. '"61 This was a shorthand way of saying that the law of the forum applied,
although the law of another state applied to "substantive" issues. Even with regard
to admittedly substantive issues, territorial rules could point in different directions. In
products liability cases, for example, the law of the place of injury applied to tort
counts and the law of the place where the sales contract was made applied to warranty
counts. 62
In some respects interest analysis will lessen the likelihood of depecage. When
adjudicating products liability cases, courts will not automatically be pointed in
different directions just because physical injury occurred outside the state of sale. It
is true, however, that, on balance, policy analysis may increase the incidence of
depecage. 63 Every law in putative conflict requires separate analysis concerning its
underlying purposes and the territorial reach of those policies.
In this as in all other matters, there is no substitute for perspicacity and common
sense. If depecage produces a result different from the one that would be reached
58. Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 673, 306 A.2d 808, 818 (1973).
59. R. WEuIrAuB, supra note 2, at § 6.28.
60. See Reese, Depecage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 58 (1973).
61. See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (measure
of damages for wrongful death).
62. See Handy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del. 1971).
63. See Juenger, supra note 5, at 10, 41-42; Wilde, Depecage in the Choice of Tort Law, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 329,
345-46 (1968).
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under the law of any jurisdiction, this may be either a superior accommodation of state
policies or a horrible and unfair distortion of those policies. In a products liability suit,
for example, it may be that the victim is entitled to the generous compensation
policies of his domicile if that state has sufficient contacts with the defendant or the
defendant's course of conduct to make application of its law fair. It is less justifiable
to apply the punitive damages rules of the victim's home state if they permit recovery
when none would be permitted in any state where the defendant acted. In a case like
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines,64 however, it is not sensible to apply the degree-of-
culpability measure of wrongful death recovery in force at the place of the crash but
remove the statutory limit on that recovery. This is likely to produce a higher recovery
than would be available under the law of any contact state, advance the policies of
none of these states, and therefore be unfair to the defendant.
I. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. Functional Considerations
Much of the literature illustrating interest analysis has focused on guest statutes,
which prevent a guest passenger from recovering against his host driver unless the
driver is guilty of more than "ordinary" negligence. 65 Now that guest statutes have
all but disappeared, 66 it is time to focus on more practical and difficult topics, such
as products liability. 67 Even within a single jurisdiction, there are many complex rules
relating to products liability. Each suit is likely to be based on at least three theories-
64. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). In Kilberg, a New York domiciliary boarded the
defendant's airplane in New York. The plane crashed at its destination in Massachusetts and the New Yorker was killed.
The Massachusetts wrongful death act measured recovery according to the culpability of the defendant, but had a $15,000
limit on recovery. New York had no limit on recovery, but measured compensation by the amount of pecuniary loss to
the decedent's dependents. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Massachusetts recovery limit was inapplicable
because it was procedural and against public policy.
For anotherexample ofimproper depecage, see Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc., 712 F.2d 1069 (6th Cir. 1983), which
applies Kentucky law to deny an employer a cause of action for injury to an employee and Ohio law to prevent indemnity
for worker's compensation benefits paid to the employee's widow.
65. See, e.g., Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confiusion in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1, 34-39.
66. In 1970, 28 states had statutory orjudge-made rules that prevented any guest passenger in an automobile from
recovering for his host's ordinary negligence. See R. WEtrM'AUt, supra note 38, at 207. In 1980, there were only 9 such
states. See R. WEiNTRAuB, supra note 2, at § 6.9. As of June 1, 1985 only Alabama retained a traditional guest statute. ALA.
CODE § 32-1-2 (1983). The Arkansas statute was repealed by 1983 Ark. Acts, No. 13, §§ 1, 2. The Delaware statute was
repealed by 64 Del. Laws 59 § I. The Indiana statute was changed from one of general application to one preventing
recovery only by guests who are family members or hitchhikers. IND. CODE ANN. § 9-3-3-1 (West Supp. 1984). The Iowa
statute was held to violate the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution. Bierkamp v. Rodgers, 293 N.W.2d 577
(Iowa 1980). The Nebraska statute was amended to apply only to guests who are spouses or within the second degree of
consanguinity or affinity. NEB. LAws 1981, LB 54, § 1. The Oregon statute was amended to apply only to guests in aircraft
and watercraft. OR. REv. STAT. § 30.115 (1983). The Texas statute, which had been amended to apply only to guests
within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, was declared unconstitutional under the "equal rights" provision
of the Texas Constitution. Whitworth v. Bynum, No. C-3547, slip op. (Tex. July 10, 1985). The Utah statute was held
to violate the equal protection clause of the Utah Constitution. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). Georgia
formerly had a judge-made rule preventing recovery by guests for the ordinary negligence of a host driver. See Bickford
v. Nolen, 240 Ga. 255, 240 S.E.2d 24 (1977). A statute now permits recovery. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-104.1 (1984).
67. This is the topic suggested by Professor P. J. Kozyris, Chairman of the American Association of Law Schools
Section on Conflict of Laws at the time of the January 1985 Association meeting. This article is the basis for my
presentation at that meeting.
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negligence, strict liability in tort, 68 and breach of warranty. If the victim is a
consumer, there are likely to be additional counts based on special federa169 and
state7o legislation intended to protect consumers. Thus, different elements of the cause
of action, different defenses, and different doctrines of contributory and comparative
fault are likely to apply to each theory. This chaos is compounded exponentially when
the different rules of other jurisdictions are considered. The litigant's ultimate
nightmare is reached if there are multiple defendants and hundreds of plaintiffs, all
from different jurisdictions, as will occur in the typical airplane crash 7' or class
action. 72
There is no conflicts magic that can make sense of the underlying bedlam of rules
that passes for products liability law. However, it is possible to formulate choice-
of-law rules that take account of the interests of the various contact states and resolve
the policy clashes that result. This can be done by recognizing the widely shared
developments that make it more likely that victims will be adequately compensated.
This suggests a plaintiff-favoring rule. If such a rule is to be fair to the defendant, it
must choose plaintiff-favoring law only if that law's compensation policy will be
advanced by recovery and only if the jurisdiction with that rule has a sufficient nexus
with the defendant or defendant's course of conduct to make the use of its law
reasonable. The rule that emerges will resemble the Hague Convention on the Law
Applicable to Products Liability. 73
68. See REsTATEMEsNT (SECOND) OF TORTs, § 402 A (1965).
69. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-83 (1982), the Consumer Product Safety Act. Section 2072 of the Act permits
recovery of damages resulting from a knowing violation of a rule or order issued by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission. Recovery under the section may also include attorney's fees and other costs of suit.
70. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316(5) (Supp. 1984) (non-uniform addition to Maine's version of
the Uniform Commercial Code):
Any language, oral or written, used by a seller or manufacturer of consumer goods and services, which attempts
to exclude or modify any implied warranties [ofn merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose or to exclude
or modify the consumer's remedies for breach of those warranties, shall be unenforceable. Consumer goods and
services are those new or used goods and services, including mobile homes, which are used or bought primarily
for personal, family, or household purposes. Id.
71. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878
(1981) (wrongful death actions filed against the airplane manufacturer and the airline in six different district courts on
behalf of dependents and decedents from ten states, Puerto Rico, and three foreign countries-defendants' conduct had
contacts with seven states).
72. See, e.g., In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1417
(1984) ("agent orange" litigation in which the special master estimated the number of potential claimants to exceed
40,000 from every state and several foreign countries). See also In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580
F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) and Judge Weinstein's 21 page "guide" to his "present thinking" on the
conflict-of-laws issues in the case. Id. at 713.
73. Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, III Acts and Documents of the 12th Session of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law (1972), reprinted in 21 AM. J. Comp. L. 150 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Convention].
The Convention first entered into force on January 10, 1977 after it had been ratified by France, Norway, and
Yugoslavia. It was ratified by the Netherlands in 1979 and has been signed but not ratified by Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg,
and Portugal. 31 NErHERLANDS INT'L L. REv. 272-73 (1984).
The Convention applies to the liability of all persons, other than transporters, who are engaged in the commercial
chain of preparation or distribution of a product. Convention, Art. 3. See Explanatory Report by IV. Reese, III Acts and
Documents of the 12th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, supra, at 252, 259. Harm covered
is "injury to the person or damage to property as well as economic loss; however, damage to the product itself and the
consequential economic loss shall be excluded unless associated with other damage. ... Convention, Art. 2(b).
The major choice-of-law provisions in the Convention are:
Article 4
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The Convention went awry in mixing the apples of plaintiff's choice with the
oranges of massed territorial contacts. Under the Convention, plaintiff can choose
between the law of the defendant's principal place of business and the law of the
place of injury only if the plaintiff's habitual residence, defendant's principal place
of business, and the place where the product was acquired are in different jurisdic-
tions.74 If the plaintiff's residence is also the place where the product was acquired
or where the defendant has its principal place of business, that law must apply. 75 If
this critical mass fails to form, the law of the place of injury must apply if any of
the other enumerated contacts are present. 76 It would make more sense to use a
building block approach for plaintiffs choice. If it is desirable to apply the law of
defendant's principal place of business, the plaintiff should not lose this option be-
cause there are contacts with other places that also make application of their law
reasonable. In his typically insightful manner, David Cavers has worked this basic
change on the Convention formulae. 77 He would always allow the plaintiff to
choose the law of defendant's business, but would permit an additional choice of
the law of plaintiff's habitual residence if the product was acquired there or caused
harm there. 78 The plaintiff could also choose the law of the place where the product
was acquired, even if he did not reside there, but only if the harm was caused
there. 79
There are four problems with Professor Cavers' rule. First, it still suffers from
the critical mass syndrome. Second, it may not be desirable to give the plaintiff the
benefit of defendant's law. Third, it may not be desirable to give the plaintiff the same
choice for all issues.80 Fourth, the Convention rule protecting the reasonable expec-
tations of the defendant is preferable to the Cavers rule.
The applicable law shall be the internal law of the State of the place of injury, if that State is also-
(a) the place of the habitual residence of the person directly suffering damage, or
(b) the principal place of business of the person claimed to be liable, or
(c) the place where the product was acquired by the person directly suffering damage.
Article 5
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, the applicable law shall be the internal law of the State of the
habitual residence of the person directly suffering damage, if that State is also-
(a) the principal place of business of the person claimed to be liable, or
(b) the place where the product was acquired by the person directly suffering damage.
Article 6
Where neither of the laws designated in Articles 4 and 5 applies, the applicable law shall be the internal law of
the State of the principal place of business of the person claimed to be liable, unless the claimant bases his claim
upon the internal law of the State of the place of injury.
Article 7
Neither the law of the State of the place of injury nor the law of the State of the habitual residence of the person
directly suffering damage shall be applicable by virtue of Articles 4, 5 and 6 if the person claimed to be liable
establishes that he could not reasonably have foreseen that the product or his own products of the same type
would be made available in that State through commercial channels.
74. Conrention, supra note 73, at Art. 6.
75. Id. at Art. 5.
76. Id. at Art. 4.
77. See Cavers, The Proper Low of Producer's Liability, 26 Irr'L & Co.tp. L.Q. 703, 728-29 (1977).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Professor Cavers does say: "In a fully developed set of proposals I should hesitate to rule out depecage . . "
Id. at 709.
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If the plaintiff acquires the product outside of his residence, Professor Cavers
allows the plaintiff to choose the law of the place of purchase only if the harm occurs
there.8 Occurrence of the harm there is likely to be fortuitous and adds nothing to the
fairness of applying the law of that jurisdiction.
The hardest question for interest analysis is whether plaintiff should be able to
choose the law of defendant's principal place of business if that law is more favorable
to plaintiff than the law of his residence or the law of the place of purchase. In favor
of this choice, it can be argued that the state where defendant acted wishes to deter
improper manufacture, 82 the defendant can hardly complain about being subjected to
his or her "own" law, and the plaintiff's residence can have no objection to more
adequate compensation at the expense of foreigners. But a number of courts,
including the United States Supreme Court, have found the deterrence argument too
weak in this context to influence choice of law. 83 Moreover, circumstances could
deprive the other two arguments of cogency. The place of plaintiff's residence may
wish to encourage within its borders the sale or manufacture of the product. For
81. Id.
82. For cases in which the courts based their choice of law at least in part on the deterrence argument, see, Tomilin
v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1981) (period of limitations, law of manufacturer's principal place of
business); In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim, Germany, 575 F. Supp. 521, 526 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (whether recovery
available under strict liability theory, law of place of manufacture); Baird v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 491 F. Supp. 1129,
1140-41 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (whether recovery available under strict liability theory, law of place of manufacture; but
applies the rules of plaintiff's domicile that limit or prevent recovery on the issues of measure of damages and loss of
consortium, id. at 1151-52); cf. Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974) (whether recovery
available under strict liability theory, law of place of manufacture; but court notes special circumstances here of a product
used on a military post in training exercises giving the state where injury occurred "little if any contact with or interest
in the parties or in the subject matter of this litigation," id. at 870); Melton v. Borg-Warner Corp., 467 F. Supp. 983
(W.D. Tex. 1979) (apply law of place of manufacture on the ground that in "a products liability case, it is the product,
not the conduct of the parties, their agents or employees, which is the subject of [the] lawsuit," id. at 986); Mitchell v.
United Asbestos Corp., 100 111. App. 3d 485, 426 N.E.2d 350 (1981) (statutory limit on wrongful death recovery, place
where decedent had worked with asbestos has interest in deterring wrongful conduct).
83. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (the Court held that theforum non conveniens
dismissal of an action brought on behalf of Scottish plaintiffs was not an abuse of discretion and the Court did not decide
whether the law of Pennsylvania, where the helicopter was manufactured, or the law of Scotland, where it crashed, should
apply; but, even though it is likely that a Scottish court would apply Scottish law, which does not include strict liability,
the Court rejected the argument that the dismissal was an abuse of discretion and stated that "the incremental deterrence
that would be gained if this trial were held in an American court is likely to be insignificant," id. at 260-61); Bennett
v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 679 F.2d 630, 632, on rehearing, 686 F.2d 406,408 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1210 (1983); Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories Div. of Am. Home Prods. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (unfair
to defendant to impose upon it standards higher than those of country where product distributed); Jones v. Searle
Laboratories, 93 Ill. 2d 366, 444 N.E.2d 157 (1982); Deemer v. Silk City Textile Mach. Co., 193 N.J. Super. 643, 475
A.2d 648 (App. Div. 1984) ("Whatever incidental benefits a liability judgment may contribute toward the correction of
a defective design or the deterrence of wrongful conduct with respect to the future distribution of a product, the principal
aim of a product liability or other personal injury claim is fairly to compensate the injured party," id. at 651, 475 A.2d
at 652); cf. Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 730 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1984) (the state where plaintiffs were domiciled
and injured has a stronger interest than the state where the product was manufactured, even though law of domicile bars
action); Hines v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 728 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1984) (apply law of place where plaintiff resided when
injured although its law bars action); Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932 (Me. 1982) (apply law where plaintiff
resides despite his argument that plaintiff's residence has no interest in applying law more favorable to defendant than law
of place where defendant does business or product acquired, but then change law of residence to accord with law of other
contact states permitting recovery without privity); Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc., 44 N.Y.2d 698, 376 N.E.2d 914,
405 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1978) (allowing plaintiff to choose whatever law is most favorable to him is "incongruous"); Bewers
v. American Home Prod. Corp., 99 A.D.2d 949,472 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1st Dept. 1984) (United Kingdom has greater interest
in applying its law to product manufactured and distributed there despite fact that United States defendants licensed the
manufacture and are alleged to have engaged in a conspiracy to market the product in the United Kingdom without
adequate warnings).
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example, a country that is striving to reduce its birth rate may wish to have an
effective oral contraceptive distributed there without the hindrance of either strict
liability or what that country considers excessive warnings. 84 Application of defen-
dant's law, when it is more favorable to plaintiff than the law where plaintiff resides,
may discourage commercial enterprises from locating in defendant's state. It is also
likely to cause forum shopping as the afflicted converge on local courts much to the
discomfort of judicial administrators and the delight of the plaintiffs' bar.85 If
defendant's state has no such concerns and wishes to be magnanimous, and if
plaintiff's state has no objection, then it is fine to open the floodgates. However, a
rule with the opposite presumption would be preferable.
Even if the plaintiff's state provides the most generous compensation and it is fair
to the defendant to be exposed to this law, it is not necessarily desirable to apply that
law to punitive damages. A number of courts have held that plaintiff's residence is
interested in the adequacy of recovery for actual damages, but that the award of
punitive damages should be left to jurisdictions where the defendant has acted in a
manner sufficiently outrageous to warrant such damages. 86 It is those jurisdictions
that should decide whether defendant's conduct should be punished and deterred. 87
Finally, Professor Cavers would permit application of the law of plaintiff's
residence or of the place of acquisition if the defendant could "reasonably have
foreseen the presence in that State" 88 of the product. The Convention requires that the
defendant be able to foresee the product's presence there "through commercial
channels." 89 The Convention rule is better. Tourists who buy products abroad should
not be able to subject foreign manufacturers to liability rules more favorable to users
than the rules of any place where the goods are marketed.
B. Proposed Choice-of-Law Rule for Products Liability
In the light of the preceding discussion, the following rule is suggested for
products liability cases:
84. See Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories Div. of Am. Home Prods. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (E.D. Pa. 1980):
Faced with different needs, problems and resources . . . India may, in balancing the pros and cons of a drug's
use, give different weight to various factors than would our society, and more easily conclude that any risks
associated with use of a particular oral contraceptive are far outweighed by its overall benefits to India and its
people. Id.
85. See Deemer v. Silk City Textile Mach. Co., 193 N.J. Super. 643, 651, 475 A.2d 648, 652 (App. Div. 1984):
Furthermore, the effect of holding New Jersey law applicable in a matter of this kind is to subject any corporation
conducting manufacturing activities in this state against whom a product liability claim is asserted to suit in New
Jersey under New Jersey law. Such a holding would have the undesirable consequence of deterring the conduct
of manufacturing operations in this state and would likely result in an unreasonable increase in litigation and
thereby unduly burden our courts. Id.
For products liability eases grantingforum non conveniens dismissals to United States defendants sued by foreign plaintiffs
injured abroad, see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories Div. of Am. Home
Prods. Corp., 510 F. Supp. I (E.D. Pa. 1980); Jones v. Searle Laboratories, 93 11. 2d 366, 444 N.E.2d 157 (1982);
Bewers v. American Home Prod. Corp., 99 A.D.2d 949, 472 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1st Dept. 1984).
86. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 594, 612-13 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
878 (1981); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 690, 705 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
87. Professor Willis Reese makes this point in his excellent article on airplane accidents. See Reese, The Law
Governing Airplane Accidents, 39 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1303, 1313 (1982).
88. Cavers, supra note 77, at 728-29.
89. Convention, supra note 73, at Art. 7.
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(I) To determine whether plaintiff will be compensated and the extent of
compensation for actual damages:
(A) Apply the law of plaintiff's habitual residence if the product that caused
the harm or products of the same type are available there through
commercial channels and the defendant should have foreseen this
availablility.
(B) If the law of plaintiff's habitual residence is not available under rule
(I)(A), the defendant may nevertheless choose that law.
(C) If the law of plaintiff's habitual residence is not applied under rules
(I)(A) or (I)(B), the plaintiff may elect the law of any of the following
places:
1. the defendant's principal place of business;
2. the place where the product was acquired if the defendant should
have foreseen its availability there through commercial channels;
3. the place where the defendant manufactured, designed, or main-
tained the product or any of its component parts.
(II) On issues affecting the availability and measurement of punitive damages,
the plaintiff may elect the law of any of the places designated in rule (I)(C).
It should be remembered that this rule is only a presumption that is likely to
represent the results of proper interest analysis and resolution of conflicts by drawing
on transjurisdictional policies and trends. If, as may sometimes occur, both defen-
dant's and plaintiff's states wish plaintiff to have the advantage of the higher recovery
available under defendant's law, then that is the law that should be applied.
The most controversial aspect of the rule is probably (I)(B), which gives the
defendant the privilege of asserting plaintiffs law as a cap on liability. There are two
reasons for this provision. First, other contact jurisdictions (those listed in (I)(C)) are
not likely to have to live with the long range consequences of what they regard as
undercompensation. Second, giving the defendant this choice makes it fairer to give
the plaintiff the choices in (I)(C) and (II).
IV. CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that there will ever be a legal system that provides simple answers
to complex questions. It is even less likely that such a system would be desired. The
territorial rules of the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws 90 approached this kind of
mindless formalism and no tears should be shed over their disappearance. The conflict
of laws has been retumed to the realm of sound legal analysis. There, with the other
subjects of the law, it will be free to adjust to constantly changing social realities.
90. REsrATEm EN OF CONFLICr OF LAWS (1934).
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